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Abstract
We consider a network economy in which economic agents are connected within a
structure of value-generating relationships. Agents are assumed to be able to partic-
ipate in three types of economic activities: autarkic self-provision; binary matching
interactions; and multi-person cooperative collaborations. We introduce two concepts
of stability and provide sucient and necessary conditions on the prevailing network
structure for the existence of stable assignments, both in the absence of externalities
from cooperation as well as in the presence of size-based externalities. We show that
institutional elements such as the emergence of socioeconomic roles and organizations
based on hierarchical leadership structures are necessary for establishing stability and
as such support and promote stable economic development.
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An age-old question in economics is how complex structures and organizations emerge from
choices made by individual decision makers in a decentralized economy. In this paper we
investigatetheemergenceoforganizationsthatareformedthroughtheleadershipofendoge-
nously emerging market makers. Our model allows not only for the endogenous selection
of such market makers, but also for the endogenous determination of the size of these orga-
nizations. Our main insight is that behavioral rules support the emergence of stable network
structures or institutions in such economies.
Our approach considers economic agents as being embedded in a given network of po-
tential value-generating economic relationships that they can activate. Within this frame-
work, we focus on the stability of emerging patterns of activated relationships. We use
straightforward extensions of standard equilibrium concepts from matching theory (Roth
and Sotomayor, 1990) and network formation theory (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) to de-
scribe such stable assignments. We then identify conditions on the network structure of
value-generating activities that guarantee the existence of such stable assignments. These
conditions point unquestionably to institutional features of the network as representing the
social capital instilled in these networks. (Portes, 1998; Dasgupta, 2005) This allows us to
additionally interpret economic institutions as social rules that support and guarantee uni-
versal stability in an economy. Instability of such patterns, on the other hand, is manifested
in a dysfunctional institutional organization in the economy.
ThroughtheworkofCoase(1937), NorthandThomas(1973), Williamson(1975), North
(1990) and Greif (2006), institutions are usually understood as devices that lower market
transaction costs. Lower transaction costs in turn result into increased market eciency and
consequently economic growth and development. Our approach, instead, takes these insti-
tutions as ﬁtting speciﬁcations of underlying network properties and forces. We consider
institutions as functional stabilizers and promoters of economic development and growth
(Klaes, 2000). From this viewpoint institutional development is more closely related to
Smithian development based on the deepening of the social division of labor, seminally
proposed by Smith (1776).
More speciﬁcally, our approach is based on a notion of stability as being attributed to the
network of socioeconomic relations itself; we identify network properties such that for ev-
ery possible conﬁguration of individuals’ productive abilities and preferences, the economy
possesses at least one equilibrium state. Individuals deliberately activate certain potential
relationships when engaging in economic interaction. We identify stable conﬁgurations of
activated relationships and determine the structural conditions under which stable conﬁgu-
rations arise for arbitrary distributions of skills, productive capabilities and preferences. In
particular, we ﬁnd that certain forms of network acyclicity form a class of crucial proper-
ties that allow for equilibrium conﬁgurations of matches to emerge. We follow a two-stage
1development of our theory. First, we discuss stability in bilateral matching markets and,
subsequently, in the setting of multi-agent collaborations in network economies.
To show the fundamental principles of our approach, we present some simple conﬁgura-
tions and debate concepts that are required to describe the endogenous emergence of stable
interaction patterns.
1.1 Matching economies
We ﬁrst address how economic agents engage in pairwise interactions that are mutually
beneﬁcial. Throughout, we assume that economic agents can only potentially engage in
economic interaction with a limited set of partners. Thus, the society is endowed with a
set of potential economic relationships that can be activated. Such a network of potential
relationships is depicted in Figure 1 on a set of ﬁve economic agents N = fa;b;c;d;eg.
Hence, the situation depicted in Figure 1 does not allow agents a and c to engage in mutually






Figure 1: Network structure A
We assume that in the network structure A depicted in Figure 1, agents interact by
exchanging (indivisible) favors (?). Thus, two linked individuals i and j in N can mutually
decide to activate the relationship ij and exchange favors. Such exchanges result into a
hedonic utility values ui(ij) that accrues to agent i from forming the exchange relationship
ij with j. We represent these hedonic utility values in the following matrix.1
1ThematrixisactuallytheincidencematrixrepresentingnetworkstructureAinwhichpotentialpayosare
reported. The number reported in ﬁeld (i; j) is ui(ij). Similarly, the ﬁeld (j;i) reports uj(ij). If no relationship
can be formed, no payo is reported. Note that we assume that agent i 2 N does not exchange favors with
herself in autarky, i.e., ui(ii) = 0.
2a b c d e
a 0 2 – – 1
b 1 0 2 2 –
c – 1 0 – 2
d – 1 – 0 2
e 2 – 1 1 0
In a matching economy we investigate a standard notion of stability. We assume that
every agent can activate at most one (potential) exchange relationship, forming a so-called
exchange pattern. An exchange pattern is stable if (i) there is no agent who prefers to
remain in autarky rather than engage with the exchange in the proposed pattern (“individual
rationality”); and (ii) there is no pair of agents who prefer to exchange favors rather than
exchanging favors with their assigned partners (“pairwise stability”). In the constructed
example there emerge two stable exchange patterns: 1 = fae;bc;ddg and 2 = fae,bd,ccg.
In fact, our main existence result stated as Theorem 3.5 implies that for any distribution of
utilities resulting from favor exchange for network structure A there exists a stable exchange
pattern that satisﬁes (i) and (ii) above.
Next we modify the structure of potential relationships on N as depicted in Figure 2. It is







Figure 2: Network structure B
We report the payos from favor exchange for structure B in the matrix below. The
underlying favors are similarly distributed as the case considered in structure A.
a b c d e
a 0 2 1 – –
b 1 0 2 – –
c 2 1 0 2 1
d – – 1 0 2
e – – 2 1 0
3We now claim that for the given payos there does not exist a stable exchange pattern in B.
Indeed, consider pattern 0 = fab;cd;eeg, then both agents d and e would prefer to exchange
favors rather than being engaged with c and being autarkic, respectively. Other patterns can
be shown to be unstable as well.
What makes exchange structure B more prone to instability than exchange structure A?
We ﬁnd that the unique feature of a network economy that allows agents to be divided into
two distinct economic roles—dark grey nodes versus white ones in Figure 1—such that
favor exchange is potentially only carried out between any two agents of distinct colors or
“roles”. On the other hand, structure B requires three distinct colors or roles, indicated as
dark grey, light grey and white. This feature ensures the stability in a structure like A, and
conversely, the impossibility of stability in a structure like B. Thus, stability of exchange is
founded on the property that the network structure has an institutional foundation on exactly
two socio-economic roles.
1.2 Introducing market makers
Next we introduce the ability of economic agents to engage in multi-agent collaborations
or cooperative economic activities. In our network setting, a cooperative activity requires
the active involvement of a convener, who brings together the group of economic agents
that forms this value-generating cooperative economic activity. Thus, the convener facili-
tates the cooperative activity and acts in all respects as a “market maker”.2 In this regard
these cooperative activities are relational forms of clubs introduced seminally by Buchanan
(1965). We consider the case that a convener can only invite economic agents to participate
in a cooperative activity if they have a potential relationship with her. In other words, the
convener only collaborates with acquaintances.
Furthermore, the economic values generated through these cooperative activities are ex-
pressed as hedonic utilities. The notion of hedonic games in the context of coalition forma-
tion was seminally introduced by Dr` eze and Greenberg (1980) and further studied by Bo-
gomolnaia and Jackson (2004), Banerjee, Konishi, and Sonmez (2001), and P´ apai (2004),
among others.3 This is a standard technique from the theory of clubs as well. We refer to
the review of Scotchmer (2002) for a discussion of this technique. It allows us to reduce the
analysis of the formation of relational cooperative activities to a single dimension, expressed
through the hedonic utility functions of the various economic agents.
We thus arrive at a network economy in which economic agents can engage into three
types of economic activities: autarkic self-provision, binary matching interactions, and co-
operative activities formed through intermediation of a convener. Each of these three types
2In this setting a market is now a cooperative economic activity in which the market auctioneer acts as its
convener. So, standard markets can be viewed as a special category of cooperative economic activity.
3We point out that what distinguishes our work from those studying coalition formation games is that we
employ a network approach.
4of activities generates dierent hedonic utility levels for its participants. We explicitly as-
sume that there are no widespread externalities among the various distinct activities; the
generated values are solely the outcome of the activities themselves.4
Returning to the examples developed above for network patterns A and B, we intro-
duce simple additive multi-agent collaborations as follows. A collaborative is now a star-
structured subnetwork of the imposed network pattern. Thus, in structure A agent a can
collaborate with b and e, while agent b could principally collaborate with a, c and d. The
convener is now the agent in the center of the star-structured subnetwork.
In the example we assume that there are no spillovers in the payos from multi-agent
collaboratives. This means that, if an agent i 2 N collaborates as a convener with agents




ui(ij)   ; (1)
where G = Gi [ fig is the complete cooperative and  > 0 is a common cost of cooperation.
Thus, if a convenes G = abe = fa;b;eg in structure A, then he receives ua(abe) = ua(ab) +
ua(ae)    = 3   . On the other hand, agent j acting as a regular member of a collaborative
around convener i just receives uj(ij) from her participation in this collaborative. Thus,
ub(abe) = ub(ab) = 1.
We devise a standard equilibrium concept in which each agent participates in exactly
one permissible economic activity. In equilibrium, no agent has an incentive to join another
potentially accessible activity. Such an equilibrium is called a stable assignment.
In the case  < 1, there is no such stable assignment in structure A as depicted in Figure
1. Indeed, take fab;ecdg, then agents a and b engage in pairwise exchange and obtain
ua(ab) = 2 and ub(ab) = 1, respectively. On the other hand, agent e as a convener receives
ue(ecd) = 2   , while (regular) members c and d receive uc(ecd) = ud(ecd) = 2. Now,
agents a and e can mutually improve their positions and agent b will not suer by engaging
in collaborative abe, where a acts as its convener. Indeed, ua(abe) = 3    > 2 = ua(ab),
ue(abe) = 2 > 2  = ue(ecd) and ub(abe) = ub(ab) = 1. Similarly, one can show that in all
other exchange patterns there will be a proﬁtable deviation, showing universal instability.
In contrast, in structure B depicted in Figure 2 there exists a stable assignment or ex-
change pattern, namely the complete collaboration fcabdeg convened around agent c. Here,
uc(cabde) = 6 , ua(cabde) = ud(cabde) = 1 and ub(cabde) = ue(cabde) = 2. Now, agent
a would rather be exchanging favors with b, but agent b would not agree due to lowering
her payo. We show in Theorem 4.6 that in fact for any payo structure without spillovers
there exists a stable exchange pattern in structure B.
It is clear from the discussion above that stability is again determined by the (insti-
4This does not, however, exclude various forms of externalities among the members of a cooperative.
5tutional) features of the network structure underlying the economy. Our main existence
theorems exactly determine these conditions. In its full development, we consider dierent
forms of stability that implement certain features of multi-agent collaboration. We distin-
guish “open” cooperatives from “closed” cooperatives in that in the latter a convener fully
controls the admittance of agents to the cooperative, while in the former this control is lim-
ited. Openness is a requirement for stability if there are certain spillover eects among
collaborating agents. Closedness can be supported in the absence of such externalities.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our network ap-
proach to economic interaction. Section 3 discusses stability in matching economies , while
in Section 4 we extend this model to include multi-agent cooperative economic activities.
In this setting we analyze the emergence of stable interaction patterns if there are no exter-
nalities and discuss the implications of the introduction of certain externalities. Section 5
oers some concluding remarks and directions for future research. Proofs are collected in
the appendices.
2 A network approach to economic activities
In this section we introduce some basic deﬁnitions and fundamental concepts from social
network theory5 and we develop the key concepts in our network approach to describing
economic activities. In particular, we use links between economic agents to describe primi-
tive binary economic interaction.
The main postulate of our theoretical construction is that all economic activities are prin-
cipally relational. More precisely, a multi-agent economic collaboration is assumed to be
structured as a collection of binary economic network relationships: Each cooperative eco-
nomic activity is embedded within the prevailing network of binary economic relationships
in the sense of Granovetter (1985). Henceforth, our theory is founded on purely abstract re-
lational activities without explicit reference to other primitive concepts such as commodities
or trade and production technologies. Therefore, an economic activity is abstractly deﬁned
as any economic interaction between a group of linked economic agents that generates a
hedonic utility value for each of its participants (Granovetter, 2005).
We emphasize that in our approach the economy solely consists of relational activities.
Within this framework a market is viewed as a value-generating cooperative activity. But
a market is local rather than global and anonymous; it is only open to its members, where
potential membership is determined by the underlying structure of potential trade relation-
ships.6
5Here we refer to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), Bala and Goyal (2000), Jackson (2003), and Gilles and
Sarangi (2010) for a comprehensive overview of network theory.
6We believe that this view conforms with markets in the global economy such as the New York Stock
6Relational economic activities
Throughout we work with a ﬁnite set of economic agents denoted by N = f1;:::;ng. These
economic agents can engage in three dierent relational economic activities that generate
individual values for the participants. The ﬁrst and most primitive form of economic activity
is that of economic autarky. In this case an agent i 2 N engages in home production.
For an individual economic agent i 2 N we denote by ii the agent’s possibility to engage
autarkically in activities that allow her to attain a subsistence level. Thus we arrive at the
class of all autarkic activities denoted by

 = fii j i 2 Ng: (2)
The second level of economic activity is that of an economic matching in the sense that two
agents i and j engage into some interaction that generates (hedonic utility) values for both
of these agents. This form of relational activity is purely binary. These matchings capture
any exchange relationship or interaction among intermediate good producers who provide
specialized inputs for ﬁnal good producers.
Formally, consider any i; j 2 N with i , j. Now we denote by the mathematical expres-
sion ij = fi; jg a binary economic activity involving agents i and j.7 The binary economic
activity ij is called the matching of agents i and j if i and j can potentially engage into the
relationship and achieve mutual beneﬁts from this relationship. Clearly, not every arbitrary
pair of economic agents can potentially form a matching. Formally, we introduce   as the
class of all (feasible) matchings with
    N = fij j i; j 2 N and i , jg: (3)
Throughout we assume that for every agent i 2 N there is some j 2 N with ij 2  .
Weregardamatchingij 2  tobepurelypotentialinnatureinthesensethatthemembers
constituting the activity ij have to consent to participate in this activity before it is realized.
Since   is a subset of the set of all possible pairings  N, it is designed to capture physical,
institutional, oranyotherconstraintsthatmayprohibittheoccurrenceofeconomicmatching
activities between certain agents. In this regard the structure   reﬂects the relational trust
that is present among the agents in the economy. Indeed, an agent trusts that engaging
in an economically relevant relationship with another distinct agent will indeed result in a
beneﬁcial outcome for herself. These restrictions, however, cannot preclude opting out of
any engagement in any economic relationship with others in the sense that each i 2 N can
exchange (NYSE), NASDAQ, and the Chicago commodity markets. All of these markets are essentially clubs,
only accessible to its members.
7We remark here that ij = ji. Note that if i = j, the relational activity ii represents again the economic
autarky of agent i.
7always decide to initiate her autarkic activity ii 2 
.
In terms of our framework one can think of the pair (
; ) as the foundation of a social
activity structure in the economy. These foundational autarkic and matching activities are
calledsimpleactivities. Thus, m = 
[ isnowreferredtoasasimpleinteractionstructure.
For any sub-structure H  m = 
 [   we denote
N(H) = fi 2 N j There is some j , i such that ij 2 Hg (4)
as the set of economic agents that are engaged within the sub-structure H. It is easy to see
that N(H) = N(H n
). Also, for every H   , if H , ?, then N(H) , ?. Finally, due to the
feasibility hypothesis, it holds that N(m) = N( ) = N.
Finally, within the setting of the simple interaction structure (
; ) we introduce the
third type of relational economic activity, that of a (relational) cooperative activity. Such
cooperative activities are assumed to be centered around a market maker or “convener”,
representing an agent who acts as a hub in the network structure of this activity.
Formally, consider the matching structure   on agent set N. Now, a cooperative is
understood as a combination of matchings in   formed around some “convener”. Thus,
a convener brings together a number of economic agents with whom she already has an
established economic relationship in the form of a matching. This is formalized as follows:
Deﬁnition 2.1 Let     N be a matching structure on N. A cooperative activity—or simply
a “cooperative”—is deﬁned as a sub-structureG    of matchings such that jN(G)j > 3 and
there is a unique agent i 2 N(G) such that Ni(G) = N(G) n fig and that for all other agents
j 2 N(G)nfig it holds that Nj(G) = fig. The agent i is called the convener of the cooperative
G and denoted by N?(G) 2 N(G).
Our deﬁnition of a cooperative imposes that a cooperative has at least three members. Fur-
thermore, a cooperative has an explicit star structure in the matching structure  . This im-
plies that the cooperative has a relational center, representing the convener as a “middleman”
binding and coordinating all constituting matchings of the cooperative.
Using this deﬁnition of cooperative activities, we can introduce some auxiliary concepts
and notation.
Deﬁnition 2.2 Let     N be some matching structure.
(a) The collection of all (potential) cooperative activities is now given by
( ) = fG j G    is a cooperative activityg (5)
( ) is denoted as the permissible cooperative structure on  .
The triple (
; ;( )) is referred to as the permissible activity structure on N con-
sisting of all autarkies G1 2 
, all matchings G2 2  , and all feasible cooperatives
8G3 2 ( ). The union of a permissible activity structure,  = 
 [   [ ( ), serves
as its alternative description.
(b) The set of conveners in   is deﬁned as the collective of conveners of cooperative
activities in ( ):
N
?( ) = fi 2 N j i = N
?(G) for some G 2 ( )g: (6)
We conclude our discussion with introducing some auxiliary network theoretic concepts that
describe features of any sub-structure of matching activities H   .
We deﬁne a path between any two distinct agents i 2 N and j 2 N in H    as a
sequence of distinct agents Pij(H) = (i1;i2;:::;im) with i1 = i, im = j, ik 2 N and ikik+1 2 H
for all k 2 f1;:::;m   1g. We deﬁne a cycle in H to be a path of an agent from herself to
herself which contains at least two other distinct agents, i.e., a cycle in H from i to herself
is deﬁned as a path C = (i1;i2;:::;im) with i1 = i, im = i, m > 4, ik 2 N, and ikik+1 2 H
for all k 2 f1;:::;m   1g. The length of the cycle C is denoted by `(C) = m   1 > 3. A
sub-structure H    is called acyclic if H does not contain any cycles.
Furthermore, there may be agents in N between whom there is no path in  ; such agents
are located in dierent components of the structure  . These components are exactly the
maximally connected sub-structures within  . Formally, a sub-structure H    is a compo-
nent of   if
(i) for all i 2 N(H) and j 2 N(H) there is a path Pij(H) connecting agents i and j in H;
(ii) for all i 2 N(H) and j 2 N(H), ij 2   implies that ij 2 H;
(iii) and i 2 N(H) and ij 2   imply that j 2 N(H).
The set of all components in a network   is denoted by c( ) = fH j H    is a component g.
Note that as a consequence of feasibility property of the matching structure   we have that
  = [H2c( )H and N = [H2c( )N(H).
The location of an agent within a network is an important characteristic. Let   be some
matching structure and let H  m = 
 [   be some structure of simple activities. We
deﬁne agent i’s neighborhood in H as Ni(H) = fj 2 N j ij 2 Hg. Note here that if i 2 Ni(H),
agent i’s autarkic activity ii is listed in H, i.e., ii 2 H. Also, by the deﬁnition of a matching
structure, it holds that Ni( ) , ? for any i 2 N. We can also express the neighborhood
of an agent within an arbitrary structure H  m in terms of its link based analogue, i.e.,
Li(H) = fij 2 H j j 2 Ni(H)g  H. For example, Li(m) = fiig [ Li( ) is the set of feasible
simple activities that agent i can potentially participate in.
93 Stability in bilateral matching economies
We ﬁrst address stable interaction in an economy with autarkic and matching activities only.
Based on these “simple” economic activities Gilles, Lazarova, and Ruys (2007) introduced
the notion of a “matching economy”. Here, we build upon this discussion.
Throughout we assume that every individual i 2 N has complete and transitive prefer-
ences over the permissible simple activities Li(m)  m = 
 [   in which she can engage.
Thus, by ﬁniteness of m, these preferences can be represented by a hedonic utility function
given by um
i : Li(m) ! R. Let um = (um
1;:::;um
n) now denote a hedonic utility proﬁle.
Here we remark that our formal theory follows, in a way, a Lancasterian approach—
separating a commodity from its properties and explaining the value of a commodity from
the utility of its properties (Lancaster, 1966)—to the performance of relational activities.8
We separate the concrete content of an economic activity from the basic abstract network
framework in which such an interaction is embedded and supported. This is represented in
the hedonic utilities introduced above.
Deﬁnition 3.1 A matching economy is deﬁned as a triple Em = (N;m;um) in which N is a
ﬁnite set of individuals, m = 
[  is a simple activity structure on N, and um
i : Li(m) ! R,
i 2 N, is a hedonic utility proﬁle on m.
Within the context of a matching economy we investigate stability of an allocation of ac-
tivities. The main hypothesis in the deﬁnition of stability is that in a matching economy
Em each individual i 2 N activates exactly one of her matchings in Li(m). This hypothesis
is founded on the fact that a matching economy is not endowed with advanced economic
or social institutions. In such a primitive setting—in which one problem is addressed at a
time—it seems natural to assume that individuals only interact with a single other individual
at a time.
Deﬁnition 3.2 An assignment in the matching economy Em = (N;m;um) is a mapping
: N ! m such that
(i) (i) 2 Li(m) for all i 2 N and
(ii) (i) = ij implies that (j) = ij for all i; j 2 N.
An assignment  is equivalently represented by the induced sub-structure   m with
 = (N) = f(i) j i 2 Ng: (7)
The set of all assignments in Em is denoted by m.
8Ruys (2011) follows a similar strategy in developing what he calls a relational capacity approach to the
social enterprise.
10We remark that by the applied hypotheses and deﬁnitions, the set of assignments is non-
empty. In particular, 
 2 m , ?. Moreover, according to the feasibility assumption on  ,
there exist other assignments in which agent i 2 N is engaged with some other agent j , i;
indeed, there is some  2 m with (i) = ij for any ij 2  .
With some slight abuse of notation, we indicate by um
i () the payo or utility that agent
i 2 N receives under assignment  2 m, i.e., um
i () = um
i ((i)).
We introduce stability on an assignment founded on the standard assumptions of individ-
ual rationality and a no-blocking condition from matching theory, denoted here as “pairwise
stability”. (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990; Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996).
Deﬁnition 3.3 An assignment  2 m is stable in the matching economy Em = (N;m;um)
if all matchings generated by  satisfy
Individual Rationality (IR): um
i () > um
i (ii) for all i 2 N, and;
Pairwise stability (PS): There is no blocking matching with regard to , in the sense that
for all i; j 2 N, i , j, with (i) , ij it holds that
u
m
i (ij) > u
m
i () implies that u
m
j (ij) 6 u
m
j (): (8)
For an economy to have persistent access to gains from organization, the social structure of
the economy has to universally admit stable matchings. Hence, whatever capabilities and
desires of the individuals—represented by their (hedonic) utility functions and (possibly)
other individualistic features—a stable assignment has to exist in the matching economy.
Deﬁnition 3.4 A matching structure   on N is universally stable if for every hedonic utility
proﬁle um on m = 
 [   there exists at least one stable assignment in the corresponding
matching economy Em = (N;m;um).
Clearly, a universally stable feasible structure thus reﬂects that the institutional organization
of the economy supports stability regardless of the exact individual preferences. In this
regard it reﬂects a network structure of the economy, which promotes and enhances the
economic activities selected by the economic agents.
The next result identiﬁes the necessary and sucient conditions for universal stability.
Similar insights have already been established in the literature on matching markets.
Theorem 3.5 A matching structure   on N is universally stable if and only if the matching
structure   is bipartite in the sense that there exists a partitioning fN1;N2g of N such that
   N1 
 N2 = fij j i 2 N1 and j 2 N2 g: (9)
11For a proof of this result we refer to Appendix A of the paper.
The generic existence result in Theorem 3.5 has a clear interpretation. Any universally
stable matching structure has to be based on two socioeconomic roles such that economic
matching activities can only occur between pairs of agents of distinct roles.
4 Stability in network economies
Next we extend the scope of the stability concept to include cooperation among multiple
economic agents.
Let  = 
 [   [ ( ) be a permissible economic activity structure on the agent set
N. An agent i 2 N has complete and transitive preferences over the activities in which he
or she potentially can participate. We assume that these preferences can be represented by
a hedonic utility function. Such a hedonic utility function is essentially indirect in that it
captures the utility of the value generating activities.
For i 2 N we introduce Ai() as the set of all permissible activities in which agent i
participates. Formally,
Ai() = fiig [ fij j ij 2  g [ fG j G 2 ( ) and i 2 N(G)g: (10)
We denote by A() = [i2NAi() the collection of all activities available to the agents in the
economy.
For every economic agent i 2 N, preferences are now introduced through the hedonic
utility function ui: Ai() ! R. Let u = (u1;:::;un) be a proﬁle of hedonic utility functions
for all agents in N. Let U be the set of all proﬁles of hedonic utility functions on  .
Now a network economy is deﬁned to be the set of permissible relational activities (au-
tarky, matchings, and cooperatives) and a hedonic utility function that assigns a value to
every agent in each of these permissible activities. This is formalized as follows.
Deﬁnition 4.1 A network economy is introduced as a triple E = (N;;u) in which N is a
ﬁnite set of economic agents  = 
 [   [ ( ) is a permissible economic activity structure
based on some matching structure  , and u 2 U is a proﬁle of hedonic utility functions such
that ui: Ai() ! R for every i 2 N.
Finally we discuss two notions of equilibrium for such network economies. To analyze
stability we again adapt the concept of pairwise stability in the same fashion as formalized
for matching economies in Deﬁnition 3.3.
Deﬁnition 4.2 Let E = (N;;u) be a network economy.
(a) An assignment in E is a mapping : N ! A() such that
12(i) (i) 2 Ai(), and
(ii) (i) = G 2  implies that (j) = G for all j 2 N(G).
An assignment  generates a corresponding partitioning given as its image  =
(G1;:::;Gm)  (N)  .
(c) An assignment ?: N ! A() generating ? = (G?
1;:::;G?
m) is stable in the net-
work economy E if for every p 2 f1;:::;mg the activityG?
p 2 ? satisﬁes the individ-
ual rationality [IR] and two pairwise stability conditions [PS] and [PS*] as speciﬁed
below:
IR for all i 2 N(G?
p) it holds that ui(G?
p) > ui(ii);
PS for all distinct agents i 2 N(G?
p) and j 2 N(G?






p) implies uj(ij) 6 uj(G
?
q); (11)
PS* and for all distinct agents i 2 N(G?
p) and j 2 N(G?
q) with q 2 f1;:::;mg with
ij 2  , ij < G?
p \G?









q [ fijg) 6 uj(G
?
p): (12)
(d) An assignment ?: N ! A() generating ? = (G?
1;:::;G?
m) is strongly stable in
the network economy E if ? is stable in E and for every p 2 f1;:::;mg the activity
G?
p 2 ? satisﬁes additionally Reduction Proofness [RP]:
RP If G?
p is a cooperative economic activity, i.e., G?
p 2 ( ) \ ?, it holds that for





where i = N?(G?
p) = N?(G) is the convener of both cooperative economic
activities.
As in the case with matching economies, here it is again assumed that agents participate in
a single activity. An assignment is deﬁned to be stable if it satisﬁes certain standard stability
conditions from game theory, in particular matching theory (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990),
network formation theory (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996), and core theory for Tiebout and
club economies (Gilles and Scotchmer, 1997).
Condition IR is a standard individual rationality condition that allows an individual to
opt out of an economic activity if she is better o being autarkic. The ﬁrst pairwise stability
13condition PS rules out blocking opportunities for pairs of agents who are not connected to
each other in the same cooperative. It requires that there are no pairs of such agents who
prefer to be linked to each other rather than to the agents with whom they are linked in the
present assignment. Condition PS has already been applied in Deﬁnition 3.3 of a stable
assignment for matching economies.
The second pairwise stability condition PS* rules out blocking opportunities for pairs of
agents at least one of whom can add a link without severing his existing links in the present
assignment. Hence, such an agent is either a convener in the present assignment, or she
is linked in a matching with another distinct agent and not member of a cooperative. This
condition requires that there are no two distinct agents who want to be linked to each other
in a cooperative in which one of them is a convener.9
Both PS and PS* are concerned with the re-structuring of the prevailing assignment.
These conditions still do not allow the convener of a cooperative to block access to this
cooperative by an existing member, if it is to their gain. Hence, stability of an assignment
deﬁnes a notion of cooperatives that are principally “open” in the sense that once an agent
has fulﬁlled certain entry requirements she cannot be stropped o her membership. There
are numerous cooperative activities that satisfy the principle of openness such as trading
posts (stores) and markets, open source communities, and many economic service provi-
sion cooperatives (clubs). In most of these cases, if entrants follow the house rules of the
cooperative in question, they will not be excluded from participation.
The stronger notion of strong stability excludes the possibility of open cooperative ac-
tivities. Condition RP explicitly “closes” a cooperative in the sense that the convener is
allowed to discontinue participation of existing members based on her own preferences.
In economic practice we encounter many such closed cooperatives as well. We mention
as examples team production situations (e.g., health care provision), particular upstream-
downstream relationships in which a primary input producer may discontinue supply to a
ﬁnal good producer and vice versa, and exclusive clubs (guilds and unions).
Under (regular) stability, a convener is merely a coordinator of a cooperative economic
activity who is open to participation, while under strong stability a convener is considered
to be a manager of the cooperative activity under consideration. We emphasize that strong
stability implies stability, i.e., management implies coordination, but that the reverse is not
true. We refer to the example in Section 1.1 for an explicit comparison of stability and strong
stability.
9Note that a convener and an agent linked in a matching with another distinct agent have multiple blocking
opportunities available: such agents can add a link with or without severing their current links. Such agents
are subject to both (no blocking) conditions PS and PS*.
144.1 Separability: The absence of externalities
After having established a model of relational economic activities, we investigate the ex-
istence of stable assignments. We have to distinguish two types of network economies:
economieswithrelationalexternalitiesaectingtheperformanceofcooperativesandeconomies
without such network externalities. We ﬁrst investigate economies without network exter-
nalities.
Deﬁnition 4.3 Let E = (N;;u) be a network economy.
(i) The hedonic utility function ui: Ai() ! R exhibits no externalities if for all
Gi 2 Ai() and Hi 2 Ai() with Ni(Gi) = Ni(Hi), it holds that ui(Gi) = ui(Hi). The
collection of all utility proﬁles exhibiting no externalities is denoted by Un  U.
(ii) The network economy E = (N;;u) is separable if ui 2 Un for every agent i 2 N.
The non-externality property on a hedonic utility function imposes that an agent derives
value only from matchings with agents with whom she is linked directly. Thus, changes
in cooperatives regarding third parties do not aect the hedonic utility value of a member
of that cooperative. Although this seems to be a very severe condition, it is a common
assumption in traditional public economics, where the public good itself acts as a convener
in our terms.10
In addition to separability, we introduce a second property of the hedonic utility func-
tions and that is superadditivity. This superadditivity property reﬂects synergies which are
assumed to be attributed to the convener who acts as a coordinator in the value generation
process.
Deﬁnition 4.4 Let   be a permissible activity structure on N. For agent i 2 N, the hedonic
utility function ui: Ai() ! R is superadditive if for any Gi 2 Ai() and Hi 2 Ai() with
Gi [ Hi 2 Ai() and Gi \ Hi = ? it holds that ui(Gi [ Hi) > ui(Gi) + ui(Hi).
Furthermore, we say that a utility proﬁle u 2 U on   is superadditive if the hedonic utility
function ui is superadditive for every agent i 2 N. The collection of all superadditive utility
proﬁles is denoted by Us  U.
Within the context of network economies we address the existence of stable assignments for
arbitrary separable and superadditive hedonic utility proﬁles. Formally, we introduce:
Deﬁnition 4.5 Let   be a matching structure and let U?  U be some given class of per-
missible utility proﬁles on the matching structure  . The matching structure   is universally
(strongly) stable on the class U? if for every utility proﬁle u 2 U? there exists a (strongly)
stable assignment ? in the network economy E = (N;;u).
10In this regard if all cooperatives exhibit such non-externalities towards its members, the activities repre-
sented through these cooperatives are separable and, thus, can in principle be evaluated objectively. This is the
principle of pricing membership of clubs in a club economy (Gilles and Scotchmer, 1997), or the Samuelson
conditions in the ecient provision of a pure public good in the sense of Samuelson (1954).
15We denote by U = Us \ Un the class of all hedonic utility proﬁles that satisfy the superad-
ditivity as well as the non-externality properties.
Theorem 4.6 The matching structure   is universally strongly stable on the class U of
superadditive hedonic utility proﬁles exhibiting no externalities if and only if   satisﬁes the
property that, if   contains a cycle C   , then C has length `(C) = 3k where k 2 N.
The proof of Theorem 4.6 is given in Appendix B.
Theorem 4.6 states that under some regularity conditions, a permissible activity structure is
universally strongly stable for hedonic utility proﬁles without externalities if and only if the
network structure exhibits a certain acyclicity property. Unfortunately, the partial acyclicity
condition on the permissible activity structure stated in the assertion is more dicult to
interpret than the condition stated in Theorem 3.5.11
However, from Theorem 4.6 we may derive some more directly interpretable conclu-
sions. In particular, if the network structure is acyclic, then the permissible activity structure
is universally stable for utility proﬁles exhibiting no externalities.
Corollary 4.7 If the matching structure   is acyclic, then   is universally strongly stable on
the class U of superadditive hedonic utility proﬁles exhibiting no externalities.
One particular interesting class of acyclic matching structures is that of the hierarchical
structures. Within a hierarchical structure, multiple levels can be distinguished in which
agents in a certain level can only communicate with agents in lower and higher levels. It is
well-accepted that hierarchical structures are common institutional features of any contem-
porary society. In particular, social roles are usually assigned to correspond to the various
levels within the hierarchical power structure in the economic and political sphere of a soci-
ety.
The main conclusion from the assertion stated in the corollary is that if a society is
hierarchically structured, it is universally strongly stable. In this regard a hierarchical orga-
nization structure is a “mode of governance” and as such the corresponding social role and
authority structure steer the society towards a (strongly) stable state. As such, a hierarchical
organization of a society supports and promotes economic development and stability.
4.2 Introducing size-based externalities
Next we consider certain conditions under which stable assignments emerge in the presence
of externalities. We investigate a simple size-based formulation of externalities. The more
11The condition formulated in Theorem 4.6 can partially be interpreted. We note that if all agents in N
assume one of three socioeconomic roles such that in  : (i) agents of two of the three types link with at most
one of any other type; and (ii) agents of one particular type can link with multiple other types. The third type
clearly refers to a class of market makers or middlemen. This illustrated in the example of an island economy
discussed in Section 1.1.
16membersacooperativehas, themoreitaectstheresultingvalueforitsmembers. Suchsize-
based externalities are very common as every bounded facility is subject to crowding. In the
literature on Tiebout and club economies such crowding externalities have been investigated
extensively. We refer here to the seminal paper by Conley and Wooders (1997) and the
subsequent work by Conley and Konishi (2002). For the case of size-based externalities we
are able to state a rather general result concerning existence of stable assignments.
For utility proﬁles with size-based externalities, the number of agents in a cooperative
is determining the size of the externality. The identity of the convener of the cooperative
determines whether the externality is positive or negative, but the identity of the remainder
of the cooperative membership is irrelevant for the amount of externality generated.
Deﬁnition 4.8 Let E = (N;;u) be a network economy. Then the utility function u exhibits




ui(ij) + c  [#N(G)   2] (14)
for all i 2 N(G), where c = N?(G) and c 2 R.
If a convener c has an externality parameter c > 0, she brings about a positive externality in
the cooperative. This refers to “economies to club size” based on the total size of the coop-
erative gathered around this convener. If, on the other hand, this convener has an externality
parameter c < 0, she causes a negative externality in the cooperative. This can be referred
to as “crowding” (Conley and Wooders, 1997).
First we report that there exist network economies exhibiting size-based externalities in
which there is no stable assignment. An example is presented below.
Example 4.9 Let N = f1;2;3;4g and   = f12;23;34g. Let 2 = 200 and 3 =  50. Let
the utility function be such that u1(12) = u2(22) = u3(33) =  100, u1(11) = u2(12) = 0,
u2(23) = u4(34) = 100, u4(44) = 90, u3(23) = 60, and u3(34) = 300. Using the lin-
ear size-based externality function, we can compute the utility levels in the two possible
cooperatives12 213 and 314 in a straightforward manner: u1(213) = 100, u2(213) = 300,
u3(213) = 260, u2(324) = u4(324) = 50, and u3(324) = 310.
We now claim that in this example there is no stable assignment. First, consider the assign-
ment generating (12;34). It is not stable because [PS*] is not satisﬁed: 50 = u2(324) >
u2(12) = 0 and 310 = u3(324) > u3(34) = 300. Also, since  100 = u2(22) < u2(324) = 50,
the [PS*] condition is not satisﬁed and the assignment generating (11;22;34) is not stable
either. Next, consider (1;324), which is not stable since [IR] for agent 4 is not satisﬁed:
12Here we introduce the following shorthand notation in the form of triples ijk to denote a permissible
cooperative consisting of the three agents i, j, and k where i acts as a convener. Similarly we use the quadruplet
ijkl to describe a four-agent cooperative with convener i. This notation is adopted in the rest of the paper.
1750 = u4(324) < u4(44) = 90. Moving on, assignment (11;23;44) is not stable due to a
violation of [PS*]: 0 = u1(11) < u1(213) = 100 and 100 = u2(23) < u2(213) = 300.
Finally, (213;44) is not stable due to a violation of [PS]: 260 = u3(213) < u3(34) = 300
and 90 = u4(44) < u4(34) = 100. Using the same reasoning, we ﬁnd that (12;33;44) and
(11;22;33;44) are not stable either. 
Second, stable assignments may not exist even when we impose uniform linear size-based
externalities on all conveners. The following two examples illustrate this point. The ﬁrst
example imposes uniform, but negative, size-based externalities.
Example 4.10 Let N = f1;2;3g and let   = f12;23g. Now consider 2 =  2. Let the utility
function be such that ui(ii) = 0 for all i = 1;2;3 and u1(12) = u2(12) = 3, u2(23) = 4, and
u3(23) = 1. Using the linear size-based externality function, we can now compute the utility
levels in the cooperative 213 in a straightforward manner: u1(213) = 1, u3(213) =  1, and
u2(213) = 5. We now claim that there is no stable assignment in this economy.
To show this, ﬁrst, consider (12;33). This assignment is not stable due to a violation of
[PS]: 3 = u2(12) < u2(23) = 4 and 0 = u3(33) < u3(23) = 1. Similarly (11;22;33) is not
stable. Next, (11;23) is not stable due to a violation of [PS*]: 0 = u1(11) < u1(213) = 1 and
4 = u2(23) < u2(213) = 5. Finally, (213) is not stable due to a violation of [IR] for agent 3:
 1 = u3(213) < u3(33) = 0. 
Finally, we consider a 5-agent circular matching structure. Here, uniformity of the the size-
based externality for conveners is positive. However, the emergence of a Condorcet-like
cycle in the economy prevents the desired stability.
Example 4.11 Let N = f1;2;3;4;5g and let   = f12;15;23;34;45g. Furthermore, let c =
 = 2 for all potential conveners c 2 N? (( )) = N. The utility levels for each matching
is given as follows: ui(ii) = 0 for all i 2 N, u1(12) = u2(23) = u3(34) = u4(45) = 2,
u1(15) = u2(12) = u3(23) = u4(34) = u5(45) = 10 and u5(15) =  1. The utility levels
in all possible cooperatives are computed in a straightforward manner from the linear size-
based externality function: u5(125) = 1, u1(213) = u2(324) = u3(435) = u4(514) = 4,
u5(514) = 11, u1(514) = u2(125) = u3(213) = u4(324) = u5(435) = 12, and u1(125) =
u2(213) = u3(324) = u4(435) = 14. We now claim that also in this example there is no
stable activity structure. 
We conclude from these three examples that size-based externalities prevent the emergence
of a stable assignment if there are non-uniform externalities, there are negative size-based
externalities, or there are cycles in  . However, if these three conditions are excluded,
stability can still be established.
Theorem 4.12 Let E = (N;;u) be a network economy where u exhibits size-based exter-
nalities such that c =  > 0 for all potential conveners c 2 N?( ). If   is acyclic, then E
admits a stable assignment.
18A proof of this existence result is available upon request from the authors.
This assertion cannot be strengthened to cover strong stability rather than regular stability.
The next example devises a simple case satisfying the conditions of Theorem 4.12 in which
no strongly stable assignment can be constructed.
Example 4.13 Let N = f1;2;3g. Consider the matching structure   = f12;23g and the
resulting permissible cooperative structure ( ) = f213g. We consider the hedonic utility
proﬁle with size-based externalities generated by  = 2 and u1(11) = u3(33) = 0, u2(22) =
 4, u1(12) =  1, u2(23) =  3, and u2(12) = u3(23) = 1. Now we derive that u1(213) =
 1 + 2 = 1, u2(213) = 1   3 + 2 = 0, and u3(213) = 1 + 2 = 3.
We now check that in this economy there is no strongly stable assignment: f11;23g is not
stable since agent 1 wants to join agent 2 in the cooperative 213 and its convener, agent
2, agrees; f12;33g is not stable since [IR] is not satisﬁed for agent 1; f213g is not strongly
stable since its convener, agent 2, prefers 12 over 213 and thus severs the participation of
agent 3; and f11;22;33g is not stable since agents 2 and 3 prefer the matching 23 over being
autarkic.
Although there is no strongly stable assignment in this network economy, cooperative f213g
forms a stable assignment. 
Example 4.13 conﬁrms that the presence of simple size-based externalities prevents the
emergence of strongly stable assignments. Thus, in the presence of these externalities only
economies with “open” cooperative economic activities can achieve stability.
5 Some concluding remarks
In this paper we address the question how economic stability is founded on certain identi-
ﬁed properties of the structure of relationships among the constituents of an economy. We
interpret these structural properties of such economic networks as “institutional”, in partic-
ular through the assumption of socioeconomic roles by individuals in these networks. The
adoption of such roles induces acyclicity of these networks, implying economic stability.
The main conclusion from our theory is that institutional frameworks increase the stability
in an economy.
There is a signiﬁcant link of our theory with the work of Burt (1992) on structural holes
and the developed network framework of economic activities. According to Burt, optimiz-
ing the number of nonredundant contacts is a way to increase the eciency of a social
network: while the presence of cycles allows for at least two distinct paths between two
distinct individuals, in the absence of cycles, there is at most one path between any two
distinct individuals. Thus, in an acyclic structure one does not support links that provide the
same accessibility. Given that the generation and maintenance of links is costly, a structure
19without cycles is more ecient than such in which cycles are present. Last, we should men-
tion some limitations of our general framework. In particular, in our work we focus on very
special class of assignments, which consists of star structures. For complex production pro-
cesses, such as hierarchies of several levels, predominant in today’s economic world, these
tools are inadequate. A clear goal for future work is the development of a framework where
more complex patterns can be analyzed.
Future research may consider extending the proposed theory to include several closely
related concepts. First, the multi-person cooperative economic activities considered in this
paper can easily incorporate the notion of organizational “scope”. The size of a cooperative
can be interpreted as its scope and include the possibility to model market size and even
such ideas as globalization. In the current paper we did not address the eects of changes
in scope of a cooperative; these could form the basis for a more dynamic theory of market
formation and economic globalization.
Second, the model presented here can be extended to include the notion of supply chains.
Our model considers the conveners of cooperatives to be fully independent from each other
in their operations and economic activities. However, one could extend the model by linking
conveners with each other in a reduced network linking only fully developed cooperatives.
Such linked cooperatives could form chains and stand for production processes that include
the use of intermediate products, representing the traditional idea of a supply chain. The
employment of supply chains into the theory would signiﬁcantly alter the model, in partic-
ular the generation of economic values. These could no longer be abstract, but should be
based explicitly on the trade of commodities, including ﬁnal and intermediate products.
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22Appendices
A Proof of Theorem 3.5
In this section we show the existence of a universally stable matching structure. In Lemma
1, we establish some parallels with existing notions in the one-to-one matching literature.
Lemma 1 Consider a matching economy Em = (N;m;um). Let the matching structure   be
bipartite in the sense that there exists a partitioning fN1;N2g of N such that
   N1 
 N2 = fij j i 2 N1 and j 2 N2 g:
Then there exists a corresponding marriage problem (cf. Gale and Shapley (1962)) such
that a stable matching in the marriage problem corresponds to a stable assignment in the
matching economy Em.
Proof. A marriage problem as introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962) consists of two
ﬁnite and disjoint sets of players M and W. Each agent m 2 M has complete and transitive
preferences, M
m, overW[fmgandeachagentw 2 W hascompleteandtransitivepreferences,
W
w , over M[fwg. Amatchingisafunction : M[W ! M[W ofordertwo, i.e., ((i)) = i,
(m) 2 W [ fmg and (w) 2 M [ fwg. A matching  is stable if there is no (a) player m 2 M
or w 2 W who prefers to be matched to herself than to her partner in , or (b) pair of distinct
players (m;w) who are not matched by  and w M
m (m) and m W
w (w). Notice that
conditions (a) and (b) correspond to conditions [IR] and [PS] of Deﬁnition 3.3, respectively.
Consider a matching economy Em = (N;m;um) with a bipartite matching structure   such
that there exists a partitioning fN1;N2g of N with
   N1 
 N2 = fij j i 2 N1 and j 2 N2 g:
Let e   = N1 
 N2 = fij j i 2 N1 and j 2 N2 g. Next consider utility proﬁle ˜ um : e   [ 
 ! R
such that for all agents i 2 N and all matchings ij that satisfy the bipartite property but are
not feasible, i.e., ij 2 e   n  , we set ˜ ui
m(ij) < um
i (ii), and for all matchings ij 2 m, we set
˜ um = um. Clearly, ˜ um represents complete and transitive preferences one   [ 
. .
Let M = N1, W = N2, and let preference proﬁles M and W be represented by hedonic
utility functions M
i : W [ fmg ! R with M
i (Ni(ij)) = ˜ ui(ij) for all i 2 M and all ij 2 e   [ 

and W
k (Nk(kl)) = ˜ uk(kl) for all k 2 W and all kl 2 e   [ 
. The tuple (M;W;M;W) deﬁnes
a marriage problem.
Suppose  is a stable matching in the marriage problem (M;W;M;W). Consider, an as-
signment  in economy E such that Ni((i)) = (i) for all i 2 N. Notice that  2 m
follows from the stability of , which implies that for all i 2 M [ W, (i) 2 Ni(m), other-
wise there is a contradiction to the stability of  as there are two distinct players k 2 M and
l 2 W with (k) = l and kl <   such that k and l each prefer to be matched to themselves
than to each other, i.e. k M
k l and l W
l k given by the construction of ˜ u, M, and W.
Lastly, we show that the stability of the matching function  in the marriage problem im-
plies the stability of the assignment  in the matching economy (N;m;um). The proof
follows by contradiction. Suppose the matching  is stable and the assignment  is not
stable. Therefore either [IR] or [PS] of Deﬁnition 3.3 must be violated.
Suppose, ﬁrst, that[IR]doesnotholdandthatthereisanagenti 2 N suchthatui() < ui(ii).
23By construction, this implies that there is a player i 2 M13 such that i M
i (i), which estab-
lishes a contradiction to the stability of .
Next, suppose that [PS] does not hold and that there are two distinct agents i 2 N1 and
j 2 N2 with ij 2   such that ui(ij) > ui() and uj(ij) > uj(). By construction this implies
that there are two distinct agents i 2 M and j 2 W with (i) , j such that j M
i (i) and
i W
j (j) which contradicts to the stability of .
Proof of Theorem 3.5
If: Consider a matching economy Em = (N;m;um). Let the matching structure   be bipar-
tite in the sense that there exists a partitioning fN1;N2g of N such that
   N1 
 N2 = fij j i 2 N1 and j 2 N2 g:
For any preference proﬁle um, we can obtain a corresponding marriage problem as shown in
Lemma 1. The existence of a stable matching in any marriage problem is shown by means
of the constructive proof of Gale and Shapley (1962) and by means of the non-constructive
proof in Sotomayor (1996). By analogy, this proves the existence of a stable assignment in
matching economy Em for any preference proﬁles um, given matching structure  .
Only If: We show that if the matching structure is not bipartite, there exists a preference
proﬁle for which there is no stable assignment in a matching economy.
Consider a matching economy Em = (N;m;um) with N = fi; j;kg, and matching structure
  = fij;ik; jkg. Consider the following preference proﬁle: ui(ij) = uj(jk) = uk(ik) = 2,
ui(ik) = uj(ij) = uk(jk) = 1, and ul(ll) = 0 for all l 2 fi; j;kg. It is easy to see that there
is no stable assignment in this matching economy. For example, consider the assignment
(i) = (j) = ij and (k) = kk. It is not stable because pairwise stability is not satisﬁed:
uk(jk) > uk(kk) and uj(jk) > uj(ij). Similarly, one can show that no other assignment is
stable.
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.5
B Proof of Theorem 4.6
The following Lemma states an intermediate result that is required for the proof of existence
of a strongly stable assignment in a network economy without any externalities.
Throughout we let E = (N; ;u) be some network economy. As before let m = 
 [   be
a structure of feasible simple activities on N and let u 2 U be an arbitrary proﬁle of utility
functions, we denote by
Bi(
m;u) = f j 2 N jij 2 
m and ui(ij) > ui(ik) for all k 2 N with ik 2 
m g (15)
the set of most preferred partners of agent i for all i 2 N.14
13Here we assume, without loss of generality, that i 2 M. If we were to assume, instead, that i 2 W the
argument follows analogously.
14Here i 2 Bi(m;u) refers to agent i preferring to remain in autarky over being member of any matching
with another agent.
24Lemma 2 Let the matching structure   be acyclic. Then there is an agent i 2 N such that
i 2 Bi(m;u) and/or there is a pair of agents i; j 2 N with i , j such that j 2 Bi(m;u) and
i 2 Bj(m;u).
Proof. If there is some agent i 2 N with i 2 Bi(m;u) the assertion is obviously valid. Next
assume that for every agent i 2 N it holds that i < Bi(m;u) and the second part of the
assertion is not true. Then for all agents i; j 2 N with i , j such that j 2 Bi(m;u) it holds
that i < Bj(m;u). Consider agent i 2 N and without loss of generality we may assume that
the set of most preferred agents is a singleton, i.e., Bi(m;u) = fjg. So, it must hold that
j , i. Next, consider the set of most preferred partners of agent j. Without loss of generality
we again may assume that Bj is a singleton, say Bj(m;u) = fkg. It must again hold that
k < fi; jg. Subsequently, consider the set of most preferred partners of agent k. Without loss
of generality we again assume uniqueness, say Bk(m;u) = flg. It must be that l < fj;kg,
moreover l , i otherwise   contains a cycle. Hence, l < fi; j;kg. By continuing this process
in a similar fashion, given that the player set N is ﬁnite, we construct a cycle. Therefore, we
have established a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 4.6
If: Consider a separable network economy E = (N; ;u) such that u 2 U exhibits no
externalities and is superadditive. We consider two separate cases: (I) when   does not
contain any cycle and (II) when   contains a cycle with a number of connected agents that
is a multiple of 3. Let M  N be some subset of economic agents. Then we denote by
 (M) = 
m \ fij j i; j 2 Mg
the structure of economic matching activities and autarkic positions restricted to the subset
M. Using this auxiliary notation we proceed with the proof of the two cases.
Case I: Assume that   is acyclic. We now device an algorithm to construct a stable assign-
ment in the economy E introduced above. This construction consists of several steps and
collects agents in various cooperatives such that the resulting pattern is stable.
We deﬁne  1 = m, N1 = N, and 1 = ?. We now proceed by constructing the desired
strongly stable assignment in a step-wise fashion:
Let  k, Nk, and k be given for k, emphasizing that  k   (Nk) and that k    is some
partial assignment. We now proceed by constructing these elements for step k + 1. With
application of Lemma 1 to  k, there might be an agent i 2 Nk such that i 2 Bi( k;u). If that
is the case, we deﬁne
Nk+1 = Nk n fig ;
 k+1 =  (Nk+1) ;
k+1 = k [ fiig:
Subsequently we proceed to step k + 1 in our construction process.
If that is not the case, then for every i 2 N it holds that i < Bi( k;u), but according to Lemma
1 there exist at least two agents i; j 2 Nk with i , j and i 2 Bj( k;u) as well as j 2 Bi( k;u).
Take two agents i; j 2 Nk as indicated and deﬁne M = ? as well as G = fijg 2  . We now




k =  (Nknfpqg)foranymatching pq 2  k.
If for every agent h 2 Nk n fi; jg it holds that i < Bh( 
 jh
k ;u) or ui(ih) >  i, and j <
Bh(  ih
k ;u) or uj(jh) >  j, then we proceed by deﬁning15
Nk+1 = Nk n fi; jg ;
 k+1 =  (Nk+1) ;
k+1 = k [ fijg:
Subsequently we proceed to step k + 1 in our construction process.
If not, then without loss of generality we may suppose there is some agent h 2 Nk n fi; jg
such that i 2 Bh( 
 jh
k ;u) and ui(ih) >  i. Then ih is an optimal matching for agent h in
 k knowing that agent j is engaged with agent i as well. In that case we make agent i a
convener and we add agent h to that cooperative. Thus, we redeﬁne G = fij;ihg and we let
M = fj;hg.
We now follow the subsequent iterative procedure:
(|) We ﬁrst introduce  0
k =  (Nk n M)   k. We proceed as before and check whether there
is some agent h0 2 Nk n (M [ fig) such that i 2 Bh0( 0
k;u). If that is not the case, then
we proceed to (). Otherwise, we proceed to ().
() Suppose that an agent h0 can be selected as identiﬁed in (|), then we proceed by re-
deﬁning G = G [ fih0g and M = M [ fh0g. In this case the identiﬁed agent h0 is added
to the cooperative under construction G and removed from consideration. We then
return to (|) to repeat the process described there for the redeﬁned G and M.
() Suppose there is no agent h0 that has an optimal matching with the identiﬁed convener
i of cooperative G as described in (|). Then we proceed to the next step by deﬁning
Nk+1 = Nk n (M [ fig) ;
 k+1 =  (Nk+1) ;
k+1 = k [ fGg:
Subsequently we proceed to step k + 1 in our construction process.
Weproceedthroughtheprocedureuntilforsomek = ¯ k wearriveatthesituationthat N¯ k = ?.
(Note that such a ¯ k 6 n always exists.) Now consider ? = ¯ k. First, since the procedure
devised above assigns every agent to either an autarkic activity, a matching activity, or a
cooperative activity, ? is an assignment. Furthermore, each constructed activity in ?
is based on either the optimality of an autarkic activity or the optimality of a matching
activity. In the latter case, the non-externality and superadditivity properties of the hedonic
utilities imply that the utilities generated in the constructed cooperatives in ? are maximal
under the imposed restrictions as well. Finally, this also guarantees that the convener of
cooperative G 2 ( ) \ ? does not have any incentives to break any relationships with
members i 2 N(G). This implies, therefore, that the constructed assignment ? is indeed
strongly stable as required.
This concludes the proof of Case I.
15In this case there is no agent who has an optimal matching with agent i or j. In that case the matching ij
is assigned to the assignment under construction.
26Case II: The proof of Case II is based on the constructed proof for Case I above. Let the set
of matchings   contain a cycle C = (i1;:::;im) with ik 1ik 2   and m > 4 with m   1 = 3s
with s 2 f1;2;:::g. Depending on the utility proﬁle, we will distinguish two sub-cases.
Case II.1 First, consider a utility functions ui 2 U which satisﬁes superadditivity and the
non-externality property, such that either (a) there exists an agent ik with k = 1;:::;m   1
such that ik 2 Bik(m;u); or (b) there are two consecutive agents along the cycle ik 1;ik 2 C
for some k = 1;:::;m   1 with i0 = im 1 such that ik 1 2 Bik(m;u) and ik 2 Bik 1(m;u);
or (c) there is a pair of agents one of whom is on the cycle and the other not, i.e., ik 2 C
for some k = 2;:::;m   1 and j < C such that j 2 Bik(m;u) and ik 2 Bj(m;u). Then, we
can use the algorithm described in Case I to construct a stable assignment since the utility
proﬁle ensures that in any of the three cases described above, we can identify agents that ﬁt
the requirements stated in Lemma 1.
Case II.2 Last, consider a proﬁle of utility functions ui 2 U such that there is no agent ik
with k = 1;:::;m   1 such that ik 2 Bik(m;u), or there are no consecutive agents along the
cycle ik 1;ik 2 C for some k = 1;:::;m   1 with i0 = im 1 such that ik 1 2 Bik(m;u) and
ik 2 Bik 1(m;u), nor is there a pair of agents one of whom is on the cycle and the other not,
i.e., ik 2 C for some k = 1;:::;m   1 and j < C such that ij 2 Bik(m;u) and ik 2 Bj(m;u).
Then, without loss of generality, we may assume that uik(ikik) 6 uik(ik 1ik) < uik(ik;ik+1)
or uik(ik 1ik) < uik(ikik) < uik(ik;ik+1) for all k = 1;:::;m   1 with i0 = im 1.16 Suppose,
the proﬁle of utility function is uik(ikik) 6 uik(ik 1ik) < uik(ik;ik+1) for all k = 1;:::;m   1
with i0 = im 1. Then, a partial assignment ? can be introduced that consists of exactly s
cooperatives of the type
ffi2i1i3g; fi5i4i6g;:::;fim 2im 3im 1gg  
?:
Next, all other agents are linked following the algorithm presented in Case I. Thus, we have
constructed a (complete) assignment ?, which furthermore is stable: all agents who are
not linked to their most preferred partner have their most preferred partner linked to her
own most preferred partner. This implies that they have no incentive to sever their links;
moreover, these agents are not in a matching activity and, therefore, they cannot add a link
without severing an existing link.
Last, suppose, the proﬁle of utility function is uik(ik 1ik) < uik(ikik) < uik(ik;ik+1) for all
k = 1;:::;m   1 with i0 = im 1. Then, a partial assignment ? can be introduced that
consists of exactly m   1 autarkic agents
ffi1i1g; fi2i2g;:::;fim 1im 1gg  
?:
All other agents are linked following the algorithm presented in Case I. Thus, we have
constructed a (complete) assignment ?, which furthermore is strongly stable: all along
the cycle are autarkic as the only partner whom they prefer to being autarkic prefers to be
autarkic himself than to be matched with them.
This completes the proof of Case II.
Only if: Let   = 
 [   [ ( ) be a feasible activity structure and let U be the collection of
all superadditive and non-externality hedonic utility proﬁles. We show by contradiction the
necessity of the condition that   contains no cycles or if it contains a cycle it is a cycle with
16Alternatively, the proﬁle of utility functions ui 2 Us must be such that uik(ikik) 6 uik(ikik+1) < uik(ik 1ik)
or uik(ikik+1) < uik(ikik) < uik(ik 1ik) for all k = 1;:::;m   1 with i0 = im 1.
27a number of connected agents equal m > 4 with m   1 , 3s with s = f1;2;:::g.
Let there be a stable assignment in the network economy (N; ;u) for all u 2 U. Let the set
of matchings   contain a cycle C = (i1;i2;:::;img with ik;ik+1 2   for all k = 1;:::;m   1
and m > 4 and m   1 , 3s with s = f1;2;:::g.
Now, consider a utility proﬁle u 2 U such that uik(ik; j) < uik(ik;ik) < uik(ik 1;ik) <
uik(ik;ik+1) < uik(ikik 1ik+1) for all k = 1;:::;m 1 with i0 = im 1 and all j 2 Nik( )nfik 1;ik+1g.
Let ? be a stable assignment in this network economy. Note that in the stable assignment
? the largest number of agents that can form a cooperative that satisﬁes the [IR] condition
is three. We again consider two sub-cases.
Case A. First, suppose that ikik 2 ? for some k = 1;:::;m   1. Since ? is a stable
assignment, the individual rationality condition is satisﬁed for all agents in N. Hence, agent
ik 1 is in a state of autarky or connected to agent ik 2 either in the matching g0 = fik 1ik 2g,
or in the cooperative g00 = fik 2ik 1ik 3g with i0 = im 1, i 1 = im 2, and i 2 = im 3. In all
three cases the [PS] condition is violated: uik(ik 1ik) > uik(ikik) and uik 1(ik 1ik) > uik 1(g00) =
uik 1(g0) > uik 1(ik 1ik 1). Since ? is stable, then it cannot be that fikikg 2 ? for some ik 2 C.
Case B. Next, suppose that there is no agent along the cycle such that ikik 2 ?. Since ? is
a stable assignment, the [IR] condition is satisﬁed for all agents in N. Since m 1 , 3s with
s = f1;2;:::g, m   1 > 4 and there is no agent ik along the cycle such that ikik 2 ?, there
must be at least two distinct agents along the cycle, ik 1 and ik for some k = 1;:::;m   1
and k0 = m   1, such that the matching fik 1;ikg 2 ?. Then, agent ik 2 is connected to
agent ik 3 either in the matching g0 = fik 2ik 3g, or in the cooperative g00 = fik 3ik 2ik 4g with
i0 = im 1, i 1 = im 2, i 2 = im 3, and i 3 = im 4. In all cases the no blocking condition
[PS*] is violated: uik 2(ik 1ik 2ik) > uik 2(g0) = uik 2(g00) as the the matching ikik 2 <   and
uik 1(fik 1ik 2ikg) > uik 1(ik 1ik) with k 1 = m   2 due to superadditivity.
Hence, when   contains a cycle with a number of connected agents not a multiple of three,
there are such utility proﬁles that satisfy superadditivity and non-externality properties, for
which there is no stable assignment in the network economy.
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.6.
28Not for Publication
C Proof of Theorem 4.12
Before we present the proof we will introduce additional shorthand notation and some aux-
iliary results.
First, we introduce some new terms. Let E = (N; ;u) be a network economy. Let  be
an assignment. The neighborhood of agent i 2 N in assignment  is denoted by Ni(). The
utility of agent i in assignment  is denoted by ui(). Furthermore, we say that agents i 2 N
and j 2 N form a blocking pair if one of the conditions in Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed with
respect to these agents. Last, we introduce several relationships between assignments. We
will say that a blocking pair in assignment  is satisﬁed in assignment 0 if assignment 0
is formed by satisfying the condition in Deﬁnition 4.2 that is violated in assignment  for a
given blocking pair of agents i and j.
Let the assignment 0 be formed by severing all links of agent i in assignment  and
forming the autarky ii. Then the relationship between assignments  and 0 will be denoted
as 0 =  [ fiig.
Let the assignment 0 be formed by severing all links of two distinct agents i and j in
assignment  with j < Ni() and forming the matching ij. Then the relationship between
assignments  and 0 will be denoted as 0 =  [ fijg. Notice that for all agents k 2 Ni()
such that Nk() = fig, it will hold that fkkg  0. Similarly, for all agents l 2 Nj() such
that Nl() = fjg, it will hold that fllg  0.
Last, let the assignment 0 be formed by severing all links of agent i in assignment 
and forming the link between agents i and j with j < Ni() such that agent j keeps all his
links present in assignment . Then the relationship between assignments  and 0 will be
denoted as 0 = jfijg where j indicates that agent j acts as a convener and keeps all his
links. Notice that for all agents k 2 Ni() such that Nk() = fig, it will hold that fkkg  0.
Below we present some preliminary results.
Lemma 3 Let (N; ;u) be a network economy such that the utility function u exhibits multi-
plicativesize-basedexternalitieswithc > 0forallfeasibleconvenersc 2 N in( ) = ( ).
Then for any agent i 2 N and any two cooperatives G and H 2 ( ) with i 2 N(G) and
i 2 N(H) and N(G) = N(H) and N(G) , fig, it holds that
(i) ui(G) = ui(H) if and only if #N(G) = #N(H)
(ii) ui(G) < ui(H) if and only if #N(G) < #N(H).
The proof of Lemma 3 follows directly from the deﬁnitions and is therefore omitted.
Lemma 4 Let (N; ;u) be a network economy. Let   be acyclic. Then there is at most one
path between any two distinct agents in N.
The proof of Lemma 4 follows immediately from the fact that   is acyclic. As a corollary
of Lemma 4, we know that for any agent i 2 N and any two distinct agents j;k 2 Ni( ), it
holds that jk <  .
Lemma 5 Let (N; ;u) be a network economy and   be acyclic. Let  and 0 be two
assignments in this network economy such that 0 is formed by satisfying a blocking pair
between two agents s;t 2 N. Consider an agent j 2 N nfs;tg such that pjs = (i1;:::;im) with
i1 = j and im = s and t < pjs who does not form a blocking pair in . Then:
29(i) If j 2 Ns() and 0 =  s fstg, j cannot form a blocking pair in 0;
(ii) If m > 4, then agent j cannot form a blocking pair in 0;
(iii) If m > 3 and im 1s < , then agent j cannot form a blocking pair in 0;
(iv) If m = 2 and js < , then the only blocking pair agent j may form in 0 is with
agent s in which PS* condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed and agent s acts as a
convener;
(v) If m = 4, then agent j may only form a blocking pair in 0 with agent i2 and only if
Ni2() = Ns();
Proof. Consider a network economy (N; ;u) with   be acyclic. Let  and 0 be two
assignmentssuchthat0 isformedbysatisfyingablockingpairbetweentwoagents s;t 2 N.
Consider an agent j 2 N n fs;tg such that pjs = (i1;:::;im) with i1 = j and im = s and t < pjs
who does not form a blocking pair in .
(i) Let j 2 Ns() and 0 =  s fjsg. By Lemma 3, uj() < uj(0) and by Lemma 4 for
all h 2 Nj( ) with j , s it holds that Nh() = Nh(0) and uh() = uh(0). Hence if
agent j could form a blocking pair in 0, he could form the same blocking pair in .
(ii) Let m > 4. By Lemma 4, m > 4, and t < pjs it follows that Nj( ) \ Ns( ) = ; and
Nj( )\Nt( ) = ;. Hence, for agent j it holds that Nj() = Nj(0) and uj() = uj(0).
Moreover, since m > 4 for all agents h 2 Nj( ) it holds that Nh() = Nh(0) and
uh() = uh(0). Since agent j can only form a blocking pair with an agent h 2 Nj( ),
it follows that if j does not form a blocking pair in , j cannot form a blocking pair
in 0 either.
(iii) If m > 4, the proof follows the proof of case (ii) above. Let m = 3 or m = 4 and
im 1s < . By im 1s <  and using Lemma 4, it follows that Nj() = Nj(0) and
uj() = uj(0) and that for all agents h 2 Nj( ) it holds that Nh() = Nh(0) and
uh() = uh(0). Since agent j can only form a blocking pair with an agent h 2 Nj( ),
it follows that if j does not form a blocking pair in , j cannot form a blocking pair
in 0 either.
(iv) Let m = 2 and js < . First suppose that agent j can form a blocking pair in 0 with
an agent h 2 Nj( ) with h , s. This is not possible due to case (iii) above.
Next, suppose that agents j and s form a blocking pair in 0 because the PS condition
of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed. Hence, it must be that us(0) < us(js) and uj(0) <
uj(js). Since uj() = uj(0) and us() < us(0), agents j and s could form a blocking
pair in , which establishes a contradiction to the fact that agents s and t form the
only blocking pair in .
Last, suppose that agents j and s form a blocking pair in 0 becasue the PS* condition
of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed and agent j acts as a convener. Hence it must be that
us(0) < us(js) + j#Ns(0) and uj(js) >  j. Since us(0) > us() it follows that
agents j and s could form a blocking pair in , which establishes a contradiction to
the fact that agents s and t form the only blocking pair in .
Hence the only blocking pair agents j and s can form in 0 is if the PS* condition of
Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed with agent s acting as a convener.
30(v) Let m = 4. Lemma 4, m = 4, and t < pjs imply that Nj( ) \ Ns( ) = ; and Nj( ) \
Nt( ) = ;. Hence, for agent j it holds that Nj() = Nj(0) and uj() = uj(0).
Moreover, since m = 4 there is only one agent k 2 Nj( ) for whom it may hold
that uk() > uk(0) and it can only hold if Nk() = Ns(): for all other agents
h 2 Nj( ) n fkg it holds that Nh() = Nh(0) and uh() = uh(0). Therefore, if j does
not form a blocking pair in , the only blocking pair he can form in 0 is with agent
k.
This completes the proof of Lemma 5.
Proof of Theorem 4.12
Let E = (N; ;u) be a network economy such that u exhibits multiplicative size-based exter-
nalities such that c > 0 for all potential conveners c 2 N(( )). Suppose   is acyclic.
Suppose, that E does not admit a stable assignment. Therefore there exists a sequence of
assignments  = (1;:::;r) with k+1 constructed by satisfying a blocking pair in k for
k = 1;:::;r   1 such that r = 1. If not, due to the ﬁnite number of assignments, we can
construct a stable assignment by satisfying blocking pairs sequentially.
Furthermore, all assignments have a blocking pair. Hence, starting from any sequence of
assignments 0 = (0
1;:::;0
r) with r > 4 such that any assignment 0
f  0 is formed by
satisfying a blocking pair in the preceding assignment 0
f 1 for f = 1;:::;r   1 contains
an assignment 0
k   such that 0
r = 0
k. Otherwise, due to the ﬁnite number of possible
assignments, we can construct stable assignment by satisfying blocking pairs sequentially.
Without loss of generality, suppose that there is exactly one such sequence  = (1;:::;r)
with r > 4 such that any assignment k   is formed by satisfying a blocking pair in the
preceding assignment k 1 for k = 1;:::;r   1 with r = 1. Hence starting from any
assignment  by satisfying blocking pairs we reach some assignment k  . Moreover,
each assignment 1;:::;r   has exactly one blocking pair, otherwise, there are other





We will discuss all possible types of blocking pairs in 1 and show that it cannot be that
r = 1.
Case I: Consider assignment 1   with fiig  1 and fjjg  1 such that agents i and j
form a blocking pair. Hence ui(ii) < ui(ij) and uj(jj) < uj(ij). Since r = 1, there must
be an assignment q   with 1 < q < r such that either agent i or agent j forms a blocking
pair that requires him to delete the link with the other agent.
Without loss of generality, suppose agent i deletes the link with agent j. For agent i to delete
this link there must be an agent t 2 Ni( ) with t , j such that ut(1) , ut(q), so that agents
t and i form a blocking pair in q but not in 1. For ut(q) , ut(1) it must be that agent t
forms a blocking pair in some assignment k with 1 < k < q. By Lemmas 4 and 5 cases (ii)
and (iii) it follows that no agent h < Ni( )[ Nj( ) may form a blocking pair before forming
a blocking pair with agent i or j. Hence, agent t must form a blocking pair with agent i in
k and by Lemma 5 case (iii), it follows that the agents i acts as convener in that blocking
pair. Hence it must be that ui(it) >  i and ut(1) < ut(it)+i#Ni(k). By Lemmas 4 and 5
cases (i) and (iii), it follows that agent j will thus not form a blocking pair that requires him
to delete the link with agent i in any assignment k+1;:::;q.
Since agents i and t form a blocking pair in q, they are not linked in q and since agent i
cannot delete a link with agent t without deleting a link with agent j, there must be another
assignment m with k < m < q in which agent t forms a blocking pair that requires him to
31sever his link with agent i.
Because agent t forms a blocking pair in m by deleting the link with agent i, by Lemma
5 cases (i) and (iii), it must be that #Ni(q) = #Ni(k). Since there is only one blocking
pair in q and it requires agent i to delete its links, it must be that ut(q) > ut(m) =
ut(it)+i#Ni(k) > ut(it), otherwise agents i and t could form a blocking pair when i acts as
a convener. Therefore, it cannot be that agents i and t form a blocking pair because the PS
condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed. So it must be that agents i and t form a blocking
pair in q because the PS* condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed and agent t acts as a
convener. Hence ut(it) >  t. If agents i and t did not form a blocking pair in 1 it must be
that either agent t could not act as a convener in 1, or #Nt(1) < #Nt(q).
First suppose agents i and t cannot form a blocking pair in 1 because agent t cannot act as
a convener.
1. Suppose fttg 2 1. By Lemmas 4 and 5, we know that Nl(1) = Nl(m) or all
h 2 Nt( ) n fig, thus, uh(1) = uh(m). If agent t forms a blocking pair in m, such
that he deletes the link with i, t could have formed a blocking pair in 1 because
ut(1) < ut(m) by Lemma 3 and the fact that agent i cannot delete a link without
deleting all its links. Thus establishing a contradiction that there is only one blocking
pair in 1 and it involves agents i , t and j , t.
2. Suppose st 2 (1) with s 2 N(1). If agents i and t form a blocking pair in k such
that agent i acts as a convener, it must be that ut(k) < ut(it)+i#Ni(k). By Lemmas
4 and 5 if agent t forms a blocking pair in m that requires him to delete the link with
agent i, it must be to form a blocking pair with agent s as for all h 2 Nt( ) with h , s
and h , i, Nh(1) = Nh(k) = Nh(m). If agents s and t form a blocking pair in m, it
must be that #Ns(m) > #Ns(1) and agent s acts as a convener with agent t.
Hence agent t cannot form a blocking pair with agent i as t cannot act as a convener.
Moreover, by Lemmas 4 and 5 and the fact that there is only one blocking pair in each
assignment, then agent t could only form a blocking pair if agent s deletes all the links
agent t will be autarkic and since ut(tt) < ut(it) + i#Ni(k) the only blocking pair he
could form is with agent i acting as a convener.
Second, suppose that agents i and t did not form a blocking pair in 1 because #Nt(1) <
#Nt(q) and agent t could form a blocking pair when acting as a convener in 1. Since there
is no assignment 0   such that t forms a blocking pair when acting as a convener with
an agent p < Nt(1) unless #Nt(0) > #Nt(1), otherwise agent t could form this blocking
pair in k, there is no assignment q in which agent i deletes the link with j to join agent t
as a convener.
Thus we have shown that agents i and j will not delete their link, hence r , 1. Therefore,
a blocking pair when the PS condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed for two autarkic
agents cannot be part of the sequence of assignments .
Case II: Consider assignment 1   such that fjjg 2 1 and fihg 2 1 with i , h such
that agents i and j form a blocking pair because the PS* condition in Deﬁnition 4.2 is not
satisﬁed. Hence uj(jj) < ui(ij) + i and ui(ij) >  i. Consider assignment 2 = 1 i fijg.
Since r = 1, there must be an assignment m   with 1 < m < r such that either agent i
or agent j forms a blocking pair that requires him to delete the link with the other agent.
Since there is no stable assignment, there must be a blocking pair in assignment 2. By
Lemma 5 cases (i), (ii), and (iii) the blocking pair must involve agent i or j.
32Supposetheblockingpairinvolvesagenti. ByLemmas4and5andthefactthatthereisonly
one blocking pair in 1 any assignment formed by satisfying a blocking pair that involves
an agent l with i 2 pjl agent j or agent h will not form a blocking pair, unless satisfying the
blocking pair does not require for agent i to delete simultaneously his links with agents j
and h. So, for 1 = r, there must be an assignment in which agent i deletes his links with
agents j and h. To ﬁnd a contradiction we can follow the reasoning in Case I.
Suppose instead the blocking pair involves agent j. It must be that it requires from agent j
to sever his link with agent i. By Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 there is no such agent with whom
j can form a blocking pair, otherwise j could form an alternative blocking pair in 1.
Therefore, a blocking pair in which the PS* condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed for
an autarkic agent and an agent in a matching cannot be part of the sequence of assignments
.
Case III: Consider assignment 1   such that fjjg 2 1 and i 2 N(k) such that agents
i and j form a blocking pair because the PS* condition in Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed.
Hence uj(jj) < ui(ij) + i#Ni(1) and ui(ij) >  i. Consider assignment 2 = 1 i fijg.
Since r = 1, there must be an assignment m   with 1 < m < r such that either agent i
or agent j forms a blocking pair that requires him to delete the link with the other agent.
Following the method and reasoning of Cases I and II, we can show a contradiction.
Therefore, a blocking pair in which the PS* condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed for
an autarkic agent and a convener cannot be part of the sequence of assignments .
Case IV: Consider assignment 1   such that fijg 2 1. Let agent i form a blocking pair
because the IR condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed. Hence ui(ii) > ui(ij).
Consider assignment 2 = 1 [fiig. Since there is no stable assignment, there is a blocking
pair in 2. Since there is no other blocking pair in 1, and for all l 2 N n fi; jg, Nl(1) =
Nl(2) and ul(1) = ul(2) a blocking pair in 2 must involve either agent i or j and an
agent h 2 Ni( ) [ Nj( ). By Lemma 5 case (iv) this is not possible as neither agent i nor j
can act as a convener in a blocking pair.
Therefore, a blocking pair in which the IR condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed for an
agent in a matching cannot be part of the sequence of assignments .
Case V: Consider assignment 1   such that Ni(1) = fjg and j 2 N(1). Let agent
i form a blocking pair because the IR condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed. Hence
ui(ii) > ui(ij) + j[#Nj(1)   1].
Consider assignment 2 = k [fiig. Since there is no stable assignment, there is a blocking
pair in 2. Since there is no other blocking pair in 1, and for all l 2 N n fi; jg, Nl(1) =
Nl(2), and for all agents l 2 N n fi; j;Nj(2)g, ul(1) = ul(2) a blocking pair in 2 must
involve either agent i or j or an agent h 2 Nj(2).
Following the analysis in Case IV, we can show that agent i does not form a blocking pair
before he forms a blocking pair with agent j. Moreover, if there is an assignment such that
#Nj(m)  #Nj(1), then it must be that fiig 2 m and agents i and j form blocking pair
in which agent j acts as a convener and agent i is autarkic. By Case III we know that a
blocking pair between an autarkic agent and an agent who is acting as a convener cannot be
part of a sequence of assignments such that (1;:::;r) with 1 = r, and hence it cannot
be that i and j form a blocking pair. Hence r , 1.
Therefore, a blocking pair in which the IR condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed for
an agent in a cooperative who is not the convener of the cooperative cannot be part of the
sequence of assignments .
33Case VI: Consider assignment 1   such that fiig 2 1 and fjsg 2 1 with j , s. Let
agents i and j form a blocking pair because the PS condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed.
Hence ui(ii) < ui(ij) and uj(ij) > uj(js). Since this is the only blocking pair and j > 0, it
must also be that uj(ij) <  j, otherwise agents i and j could form a blocking pair because
the PS* condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed. We will show that there cannot be an
assignment q   with fjsg 2 q.
Consider assignment 2 = 1[fijg. Since there is no stable assignment, there is a blocking
pair in 2. Since there is no other blocking pair in 1, and for all l 2 N n fi; j; sg, Nl(1) =
Nl(2), and for all agents l 2 N n fi; j; sg it must be that ul(1) = ul(2) a blocking pair in
2 must involve either agent i, j or s.
Suppose the blocking pair in 2 involves agent i, then using the analysis for agent i in Case
I, it can be shown that agent i will not delete the link with agent j. And by Lemmas 4 and 5,
if agents j and s do not form a blocking pair in 2, they will not form a blocking pair.
Next, suppose that the blocking pair in 2 involves agent j. Since uj(js) < uj(ij) and
uj(ij) <  j agent j will not form a blocking pair with agent s when acting as a convener.
Since uj(ij) <  j agent j will not form a blocking pair with an agent h 2 Nj( ) with
h < Nj(1) otherwise agent j could form another blocking pair in 1.
It must be that agent s forms a blocking pair in 2. Hence, by Lemmas 4 and 5 and the fact
that there is only one blocking pair in each assignment in  the ﬁrst blocking pair agent j is
with agent s. Suppose agent j and s form a blocking pair in some assignment k   with
2 < k < q. By the above discussion, it follows that j and s form a blocking pair because the
PS* condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed and agent s acts as a convener. Hence agent
i is autarkic in k+1 and does not form a blocking pair unless it is with agent j. In addition,
there is at least one agent h 2 Ns( ) with s , j such that h 2 Ns(k). Note that by Lemmas
4 and 5 and the fact that there is only one blocking pair, h does not form a blocking pair
until agent s does not delete the link and agent s cannot delete the link with agent h without
deleting the link with agent j as well. Hence, fjsg cannot be an element of an assignment
unless agent s deletes all his links as a convener.
Suppose there is an assignment m with k < m < r such that agent s deletes all his links as a
convener and thus agent j is autarkic. Since uj(jj) < uj(ij) (otherwise agent j could form a
dierent blocking pair in 1), it must be that the only blocking pair in m must be by agent
j and i because the PS condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed. Since the blocking pair
of agents i and j entails two autarkic agents who form a blocking pair and by Case I, we
know that such blocking pair cannot be part of a sequence of assignments (1;:::;r) with
r = 1, thus, we have established a contradiction.
Therefore, a blocking pair in which the PS condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed for an
autarkic agent and an agent in a matching cannot be part of the sequence of assignments .
Case VII: Consider assignment 1   such that fiig 2 1 and fjg 2 N(1). Let agents i
and j form a blocking pair because the PS condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed. Hence
ui(ii) < ui(ij) and uj(ij) >
P
h2Nj(1) uj(jh)+j[#Nj(1) 1]. Since this is the only blocking
pair and j > 0, it must also be that uj(ij) <  j, otherwise agents i and j can form a
blocking pair because the PS* condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed. We will show that
there cannot be an assignment q   with Nj(1) = Nj(q).
Consider assignment 2 = 1[fijg. Since there is no stable assignment, there is a blocking
pair in 2. Since there is no other blocking pair in 1, and for all l 2 N n fi; j;Nj(1)g,
Nl(1) = Nl(2), and ul(1) = ul(2) a blocking pair in 2 must involve either agent i, j or
an agent s 2 Nj(1).
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I, it can be shown that agent i will not delete the link with agent j. And by Lemmas 4 and 5,
if agents j and any agent s 2 Nj(1) do not form a blocking pair in 2, they will not form a
blocking pair unless agent i deletes his link with j.
Next, suppose the blocking pair in 2 involves agent j and no agent s 2 Nj(1). Since
uj(ij) <  j agent j will not form a blocking pair with an agent h 2 Nj( ) with h < Nj(1)
otherwise agent j could form another blocking pair in 1.
Suppose agent j forms a blocking pair in 2 with an agent s 2 Nj(1) with fssg 2 2. This,
however, contradicts either Case II or Case VI.
Lastly, suppose that an agent s 2 Nj(1) forms a blocking pair in 2 with an agent f 2 Ns( )
with f , j. Hence if there is an assignment q with Nj(q) = Nj(k) agent j must form
a blocking pair and the ﬁrst blocking pair j can make by Lemmas 4 and 5 is with agent s.
Let the assignment in which agents j and s form a blocking pair is k. It must be that j and
s form a blocking pair because the PS* condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 such that agent s acts
as a convener is not satisﬁed otherwise j and s could form a blocking pair in 2. Hence
by Lemmas 4 and 5 and the fact that there is only one blocking pair in each assignment
agent j cannot form a blocking pair with an agent h 2 Nj(1) with h , s, unless agent s
deletes all his links. If agent s deletes all his links, agent j will be autarkic, and hence, must
form a blocking pair with agent i, otherwise agents i and j could not form a blocking pair
in 1. Since j is autarkic and i is autarkic when making a blocking pair with i, we know by
Case I that this blocking pair cannot be part of a sequence of assignments (1;:::;r) with
r = 1 and thus we have established a contradiction.
Therefore, a blocking pair in which the PS condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed for an
autarkic agent and a convener of a cooperative cannot be part of the sequence of assignments
.
Case VIII: Consider assignment 1   such that fiig 2 1 and Nj(1) = fsg and s 2
N(k). Let agents i and j form a blocking pair because the PS condition of Deﬁnition 4.2
is not satisﬁed. Hence ui(ii) < ui(ij) and uj(ij) > uj(js) + s[#Ns(1)   1]. We will show
that there cannot be an assignment q   with Ns(q) = Ns(1).
For Ns(q) = Ns(k), agents j and s must form a blocking pair. Agents j and s can form a
blocking pair if and only if one of them acts as a convener.
Suppose agents j and s form a blocking pair in k   and agent j acts as a convener. For
Ns(q) = Ns(1) agent s must be able to form blocking pairs as a convener, hence, there
must be an assignment m   with k < m < q such that either fjsg 2 m or s severs his
link with j. By Lemma 5 case (i) if agent j acts as a convener, agent i will not sever his link
with him, otherwise there could be another blocking pair in 1. Hence, it must be that s
severs his link with j, which implies that j must join agent s as a convener, and the analysis
below will hold.
Suppose agents j and s form a blocking pair in k   and agent s acts as a convener. For
agent j to sever his link with i to join s as a convener, it must be that Ns(k) > Ns(1)   1.
Hence, there is an agent h 2 Ns( ) with h 2 Ns(k) and h < Ns(1). So, k+1 = k s fjsg.
Hence by Lemma 5 no agent h 2 Ns(k) will form a blocking pair unless agent s severs all
his links. Suppose there is assignment m   with k+1 < m < q agent s severs all his links,
then agent j will be autarkic and must form a blocking pair with agent i as another autarkic
agent or as i acting as a convener, otherwise agents i and j could not form a blocking pair in
1 and by Cases I, II, and III such blocking pair cannot be part of a sequence of assignments
(1;:::;r) with r = 1.
35Therefore, a blocking pair in which the PS condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed for
an autarkic agent and an agent linked in a cooperative but not acting as the convener of the
cooperative cannot be part of the sequence of assignments .
Case IX: Consider assignment 1   such that i 2 N(1). Let agent i form a blocking
pair because the IR condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed. Hence 2 = 1 [fiig. Hence P
h2Ni(1) ui(ih) + i[#Ni(1   1)] < ui(ii).
Consider assignment 2 = 1 [ fiig. For r = 1 it must be that agents i and all agents
h 2 Ni(1)) form blocking pairs in some assignments. Note that fiig 2 2 and fhhg 2 2 for
all h 2 Ni(1) and thus agent i and each agent h 2 Ni(1) must form a blocking pair as an
autarkic agent. As proven in Cases I, II, III, VI, VII, and VIII assignments in which autarkic
agents form blocking pairs cannot be part of a sequence of assignments  = (1;::::r)
such that r = 1.
Therefore, a blocking pair when the IR condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed for a
convener of a cooperative cannot be part of the sequence of assignments .
Case X: Consider assignment 1   such that fijg 2 1 and fstg 2 1 with s 2 Nj( ) and
s , i. Let agents j and s form a blocking pair because the PS condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is
not satisﬁed. Hence uj(ij) < uj(js) and us(st) < us(js).
Consider assignment 2 = 1 [ fjsg. For r = 1 it must be that agents i and t form
blocking pairs in some assignments. Note that fiig 2 2 and fttg 2 2 and thus i and t
form blocking pairs as autarkic agents. As proven in Cases I, II, III, VI, VII, and VIII,
assignments in which autarkic agents form blocking pairs cannot be part of a sequence of
assignments  = (1;::::r) such that r = 1.
Therefore, a blocking pair in which the PS condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed for
two agents linked in matchings cannot be part of the sequence of assignments .
Case XI: Consider assignment 1   such that fijg 2 1 and fstg 2 1 with s 2 Nj( ) and
s , i. Let agents j and s form a blocking pair because the PS* condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is
not satisﬁed. Hence uj(ij) < uj(js) + S and us(js) >  s.
Considerassignment2 = 1sfjsg. Forr = 1 itmustbethatagentiand jformblocking
pairs in some assignment. Note that fiig 2 2 and thus i must form a blocking pair as an
autarkic agent. As proven in Cases I, II, III, VI, VII, and VIII, assignments in which autarkic
agents form blocking pairs cannot be part of a sequence of assignments  = (1;::::r)
such that r = 1.
Therefore, a blocking pair in which the PS* condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed for
two agents linked in matchings cannot be part of the sequence of assignments .
Case XII: Consider assignment 1   such that fijg 2 1 and fsg 2 N(k). Let agents j
and s form a blocking pair because the PS condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed. Hence
uj(ij) < uj(js) and
P
h2Ns(1) us(hs) + s[#Ns(1)   1] < us(js).
Consider assignment 2 = 1 [ fjsg. For r = 1 it must be that agents i and h 2 Ns(1)
form blocking pairs in some assignments. Note that fiig 2 2 and fhhg 2 2 for all h 2
Ns(1) and thus i and each h 2 Ns(1) must form at least one blocking pair as an autarkic
agent. As proven in Cases I, II, III, VI, VII, and VIII assignments in which autarkic agents
form blocking pairs cannot be part of a sequence of assignments  = (1;::::r) such that
r = 1.
Therefore, a blocking pair in which the PS condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed for an
agent linked in a matchings and a convener cannot be part of the sequence of assignments
.
36Case XIII: Consider assignment 1   such that fijg 2 1 and fsg 2 N(1). Let agents
j and s form a blocking pair because the PS* condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed and
agent s acts as a convener. Hence us(js) >  s and uj(ij) < uj(js) + s#Ns(1).
Consider assignment 2 = 1 s fjsg. For r = 1 it must be that agents i and j form
blocking pairs in some assignments. Note that fiig 2 2 and thus agent i must form at
least one blocking pair as an autarkic agent. As proven in Cases I, II, III, VI, VII, and VIII
assignments in which autarkic agents form blocking pairs cannot be part of a sequence of
assignments  = (1;::::r) such that r = 1.
Therefore, a blocking pair in which the PS* condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed for
an agent linked in a matchings and a convener such that the agent in the matching acts as a
convener cannot be part of the sequence of assignments .
Case XIV: Consider assignment 1   such that fijg 2 1 and fsg 2 N(1). Let agents
j and s form a blocking pair because the PS* condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed
and agent j acts as a convener. Hence
P
h2Ns1 us(hs) + s[#Ns(1)   1] < us(js) + j and
uj(js) >  j.
Consider assignment 2 = 1 j fjsg. For r = 1 it must be that agents h 2 Ns(1) and s
form blocking pairs in some assignments. Note that fhhg 2 2 for all h 2 Ns(1) and thus
each h 2 Ns(1) must form at least one blocking pair as an autarkic agent. As proven in
Cases I, II, III, VI, VII, and VIII, assignments in which autarkic agents form blocking pairs
cannot be part of a sequence of assignments  = (1;::::r) such that r = 1.
Therefore, a blocking pair in which the PS* condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed for
an agent linked in a matchings and a convener such that the convener of the cooperative
matching acts as a convener cannot be part of the sequence of assignments .
Case XV: Consider assignment 1   such that i 2 N(1) and j 2 N(1). Let agents i
and j form a blocking pair because the PS condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed. Hence P
h2Ni(1) ui(ih) + i[#Ni(1)   1] < ui(ij) and
P
f2Nj(1) uj(jf) + j[#Nj(1)   1] < uj(ij).
Consider assignment 2 = 1 [ fijg. For r = 1 it must be that agents h 2 Ni(1) form
blocking pairs with agent i and agents f 2 Nj(1) form blocking pairs with agent j in some
assignments. Note that fhhg 2 2 for all h 2 Ni(1) and ff fg 2 2 for all f 2 Nj(1) and
each h 2 Ni(1) and each f 2 Nj(1) must form at least one blocking pair as an autarkic
agent. As proven in Cases II, III, IV, VII, VIII, and XI, assignments in which autarkic agents
form blocking pairs cannot be part of a sequence of assignments  = (1;::::r) such that
r = 1.
Therefore, a blocking pair in which the PS condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed for
two conveners cannot be part of the sequence of assignments .
Case XVI: Consider assignment 1   such that i 2 N(1) and j 2 N(1). Let agents
i and j form a blocking pair because the PS* condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed.
Without loss of generality let
P
h2Ni(1) ui(ih) + i[#Ni(1)   1] < ui(ij) + j#Nj(1) and
uj(ij) >  j.
Consider assignment 2 = 1 j fijg. For r = 1 it must be that agents h 2 Ni(1) form
blocking pairs with agent i in some assignments. Note that fhhg 2 2 for all h 2 Ni(1) and
thus each h 2 Ni(1) must form at least one blocking pair as an autarkic agent. As proven in
Cases I, II, III, VI, VII, and VIII, assignments in which autarkic agents form blocking pairs
cannot be part of a sequence of assignments  = (1;::::r) such that r = 1.
Therefore, a blocking pair in which the PS* condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed for
two conveners cannot be part of the sequence of assignments .
37Case XVII: Consider assignment 1   such that fijg and Ns(1) = ftg with t 2 N(1.
Let agents j and s form a blocking pair because the PS condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not
satisﬁed. Hence uj(ij) < uj(js) and us(st) + t[#Nt(1)   1] < us(js).
Consider assignment 2 = 1 [ fjsg. For r = 1 it must be that agents i and j form
a blocking pair in some assignments. Note that fiig 2 2 and thus agent i form at least
one blocking pair as an autarkic agent. As proven in Cases I, II, III, VI, VII, and VIII,
assignments in which autarkic agents form blocking pairs cannot be part of a sequence of
assignments  = (1;::::r) such that r = 1.
Therefore, a blocking pair in which the PS condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed for an
agent in a matching and an agent in a cooperative who does not acts as a convener cannot
be part of the sequence of assignments .
Case XVIII: Consider assignment 1   such that fijg and Ns(1) = ftg with t 2 N(1).
Let agents j and s form a blocking pair because the PS* condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not
satisﬁed and j acts as a convener. Hence uj(js) >  j and us(st) + t[#Nt(1)   1] <
us(js) + j. We will show that there is no activity patter q   such that Nt(q) = Nt(1).
A contradiction can be established following the same analysis as in Case VIII.
Therefore, a blocking pair in which the PS* condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed for
an agent in a matching and an agent in a cooperative who does not acts as a convener cannot
be part of the sequence of assignments .
Case XIX: Consider assignment 1   such that i 2 N(1) and Nj(1) = fsg with
s 2 N(1) and i , s. Let agents i and j form a blocking pair because the PS condition of
Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed. Hence
P
h2Ni(1) ui(ih) + i[#Ni(1)   1] < ui(ij) and uj(js) +
s[#Ns(1)   1] < uj(ij).
Consider assignment 2 = 1 [ fijg. For r = 1 it must be that agent i and an agent
h 2 Ni(1) form a blocking pair in some assignments. Note that fhhg 2 2 for all h 2 Ni(1)
and thus agent each agent h 2 Ni(1) forms at least one blocking pair as an autarkic agent.
As proven in Cases I, II, III, VI, VII, and VIII, assignments in which autarkic agents form
blocking pairs cannot be part of a sequence of assignments  = (1;::::r) such that
r = 1.
Therefore, a blocking pair in which the PS condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed for a
convener and an agent in a cooperative who does not acts as a convener cannot be part of
the sequence of assignments .
Case XX: Consider assignment 1   such that i 2 N(1) and Nj(1) = fsg with s 2
N(1) and i , s. Let agents i and j form a blocking pair because the PS* condition of
Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed. Hence ui(ij) >  i and uj(js) + s[#Ns(1)   1] < uj(ij) +
i#Ni(1). We will shows that there cannot be an assignment q   such that Ns(q) =
Ns(1).
A contradiction can be established following the same analysis as in Case VIII.
Therefore, a blocking pair in which the PS* condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed for
a convener and an agent in a cooperative who does not acts as a convener cannot be part of
the sequence of assignments .
Case XXI: Consider assignment 1   such that Ni(1) = s with s 2 N(1) and Nj(1) =
ftg with t 2 N(1) and i , j. Let agents i and j form a blocking pair because the PS
condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed. Hence ui(is) + s[Ns(1)   1] < ui(ij) and
uj(jt) + t[#Nt(1)   1] < uj(ij).
Consider assignment 2 = 1 [ fijg. For r = 1 it must be that agents i and s form
38a blocking pair in some assignments and agents j and t forma a blocking pair in some
assignment. Note that fijg 2 2 and thus at least one of agents i and j forms at least one
blocking pair as an agent in a matching. As proven in Cases II, IV, VI, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV,
XVII, and XVIII assignments in which agents in a matching form blocking pairs cannot be
part of a sequence of assignments  = (1;::::r) such that r = 1.
Therefore, a blocking pair in which the PS condition of Deﬁnition 4.2 is not satisﬁed for
two agents linked in a cooperatives none of whom acts as a convener cannot be part of the
sequence of assignments .
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.12.
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